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Abstract—Considering the wide application of network embed-
ding methods in graph data mining, inspired by the adversarial
attack in deep learning, this paper proposes a Genetic Algorithm
(GA) based Euclidean Distance Attack strategy (EDA) to attack
the network embedding, so as to prevent certain structural
information from being discovered. EDA focuses on disturbing
the Euclidean distance between a pair of nodes in the embedding
space as much as possible through minimal modifications of
the network structure. Since a large number of downstream
network algorithms, such as community detection and node
classification, rely on the Euclidean distance between nodes to
evaluate the similarity between them in the embedding space,
EDA can be considered as a universal attack on a variety of
network algorithms. Different from traditional supervised attack
strategies, EDA does not need labeling information, and, to
the best of our knowledge, is the first unsupervised network
embedding attack method.
We take DeepWalk as the base embedding method to develop
the EDA. Experiments with a set of real networks demonstrate
that the proposed EDA method can significantly reduce the
performance of DeepWalk-based networking algorithms, i.e.,
community detection and node classification, outperforming
several heuristic attack strategies. We also show that EDA
also works well on attacking the network algorithms based on
other common network embedding methods such as High-Order
Proximity preserved Embedding (HOPE) and non-embedding-
based network algorithms such as Label Propagation Algorithm
(LPA) and Eigenvectors of Matrices (EM). The results indicate
a strong transferability of the EDA method.
Index Terms—Network embedding, adversarial attack, net-
work algorithm, Euclidean distance, unsupervised learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
REal-world complex systems can be represented and ana-lyzed as networks. During the past few decades, network
science has emerged as an important interdisciplinary field
aiming at using network and graph as a tool to characterize the
structure and dynamics of complex systems including social
networks, citation network, protein networks and transport
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network. [1]. Quite recently, a number of methods have been
proposed to map the nodes of a network into vectors in an
Euclidean space, namely network embedding, which largely
facilitate, the application of machine learning methods in
mining graph data [2], [3]. Network embedding solves the
problem of high dimensional and sparseness of the original
network data, and builds a bridge between machine learning
and network science, enabling many machine learning algo-
rithms to be applied in network analysis.
Many network embedding methods use random walk to
obtain the node sequence and map sparse high-dimensional
data to dense lower-dimensional Euclidean spaces. Perozzi et
al. [4] proposed the first network embedding method, namely
DeepWalk, which introduced Natural Language Processing
(NLP) model [5]–[7] into network and achieved great success
in community detection [8]–[11] and node classification [12],
[13]. Grover et al. [14] developed node2vec as an extension
of DeepWalk. They utilized a biased random walk to combine
BFS and DFS neighborhood exploration so as to reflect
equivalence and homogeneity in the network structure. Perozzi
et al. [15] further proposed Walklets to embed a network
utilizing the weighted combination of A1, A2, · · · , Ak, where
A is the adjacency matrix. Moreover, Tang et al. [16] pre-
sented LINE that preserved both the first-order and second-
order proximities to rich node representation. These network
embedding methods show the following advantages. First,
embedding can well obtain the local structural information
of the network; second, many methods can be easily parallel
so as to decrease the computation complexity; third, when the
network structure is slightly changed, incremental learning of
the changed parts can be generated to upgrade the learning
model. The representation vectors of nodes, obtained by the
network embedding algorithms, can be used to support the
subsequent network analysis tasks, such as link prediction,
community detection, and node classification.
However, while providing convenience to users, such net-
work analysis algorithms may also bring the risk of privacy
leakage, i.e., our personal information in the social network
can be easily predicted by adopting such algorithms [17]–
[19]. In recent studies of deep learning, it is found that,
while performing extremely well in a variety of tasks, deep
neural networks seem to be susceptible to small perturbations,
especially in the area of computer vision [20]–[23]. These ad-
versarial attacks usually target at specific algorithms and make
the prediction accuracy drop sharply. Quite recently, it was also
found that network algorithms in community detection [24],
link prediction [25], and node classification [26]–[28] are also
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2vulnerable to such adversarial attacks.
For instance, due to the connectivity and cascading effects in
networks, Faramondi et al. [29] analyze the robustness and vul-
nerability of complex networks. Waniek et al. [30] developed
a heuristic method, namely Disconnect Internally, Connect
Externally (DICE). They added perturbations to the original
network by deleting the links within community while adding
the links between communities. Chen et al. [24] proposed an
attack strategy against community detection, namely Q-Attack,
which uses modularity Q, under certain community detection
algorithm, as the optimization objective, aiming to disturbing
the overall community structure. Yu et al. [25] introduced an
evolutionary method against link prediction using Resource
Allocation Index (RA) so as to protect link privacy. As for
node classification, Zu¨gner et al. [26] proposed NETTACK
to fool Graph Convolutional Networks (GCN) by generat-
ing adversarial networks. Chen et al. [27] further proposed
Fast Gradient Attack (FGA) which utilized the gradient of
algorithm to design loss function. FGA model can generate
adversarial network faster and make the target nodes classified
incorrectly with quite small perturbations. Moreover, Wang
et al. [28] designed an greedy algorithm to attack GCNs
by adding fake nodes. This method generated adjacency and
feature matrices of fake nodes to minimize the classification
accuracy of the existing nodes. Those kinds of attack strategies
are always effective in most cases since they are strongly
targeted at specific algorithms.
Most of the current attack strategies belong to the supervised
learning, i.e., attackers can get true labels of nodes or com-
munities, and further utilize these information to design attack
strategies. However, in many cases, it is difficult and cost
to collect such information, making those supervised attack
strategies less effective.
In this paper, we focus on attacking the network embedding
process, rather than some particular network algorithms. Since
most network algorithms are based on network embedding,
attacking the embedding process (instead of particular algo-
rithms) could be a more generic approach that can be easily
applied to various attack tasks. Different from FGA which is
based on the gradient information of GCN, here we propose an
Euclidean Distance Attack (EDA), aiming to directly disturb
the distances between vectors in the embedding space. We
think it’s the vector distance that determines the performance
of many downstream algorithms based on network embedding.
Since we don’t need to know the labels of training data, it
can be considered as an unsupervised learning method. In
particular, the main contributions of this paper are as below:
• We propose the first unsupervised attack strategy on
network embedding, namely EDA, using the Euclidean
Distance between embedding vectors as the reference.
• We adopt the Genetic Algorithm (GA) to search for the
optimal solution for EDA. As compared with state-of-
the-art baseline attack strategies, EDA performed the best
in reducing the prediction accuracy of downstream algo-
rithms for community detection and node classification
tasks.
• We validate the transferability of EDA in the reducing the
performance of downstream network algorithms based on
a variety of network-embedding methods.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we
introduce the EDA method. In Sec. III, we compare the
performance of EDA and baseline strategies on attacking
community detection and node classification algorithms in
three real-world networks. Finally, we conclude the paper with
discussions of future work in Sec. IV.
II. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we first introduce DeepWalk briefly, based
on which we propose the Euclidean distance attack (EDA)
method. In particular, we turn the attack problem to a multi-
objective optimization problem, and then use genetic algorithm
(GA) to solve it. Here, we choose DeepWalk because it is
one of the most widely-used unsupervised network embedding
methods and it can has good mathematical properties rooted
at matrix factorizations [31].
A. DeepWalk
This paper mainly focuses on undirected and unweighted
networks. A network is represented by G(V,E), where V
denotes the set of nodes and E denotes the set of links. The
link between nodes vi and vj is denoted by eij = (vi, vj) ∈ E.
The adjacency matrix of the network then is defined as A, with
the element denoted by
aij =
{
1 (vi, vj) ∈ E
0 (vi, vj) /∈ E. (1)
Real-world networks are often sparse and high-dimensional,
preventing the wide application of machine learning algorithm
in graph data. To address these problems, network embedding
is a family of methods to encode the topological properties in
the graph data into low-dimensional features.
DeepWalk trains the vectors of nodes R|V |×n by calculating
the probability of generating the nodes on both sides from the
center node, with the loss function represented by
min
R
w∑
k=−w,k 6=0
− logP (vi+k | vi), (2)
where the sequence {vi−w, · · · , vi−1, vi+1, · · · , vi+w} is ob-
tained by random walk within the window w around the center
node vi, and the probability P (vi+k|vi) can be transformed by
the following softmax function [32], [33]:
P (vi+k | vi) =
exp(rir
T
i+k)
|V |∑
n=1
exp(rirTn )
, (3)
where ri is the representation vector of node vi.
B. EDA on network embedding
Many machine learning methods are based on the relative,
rather than absolute, positions of samples in Euclidean space.
Thus the Euclidean distance between samples playing a key
role in these methods. Moreover, due to the randomness
of many network embedding algorithms, embedding vectors
generated for the same node in different rounds might be
3individual 1
popolation

)2,1(e

)8,7(e
…
…

)8,2(e

)6,4(e

)7,1(e

)5,3(e
…
…
4
3
1
6
5
2
8
7

)3,2(e

)4,1(e
…
…

)5,4(e

)7,3(e

)8,7(e

)6,1(e

)4,3(e

)7,2(e
…
…

)7,3(e

)8,2(e

)8,4(e

)7,6(e
individual 2 individual h
gene  1 gene  i
Fig. 1. Encoding of network. The individual solution includes i genes formed by adding and deleting links, and a population consists of h individuals. The
sets of added and deleted links are represented in gray and yellow, respectively.
different from each other. Regardless of such differences, the
Euclidean distance between the same pair of nodes in the
embedding space is approximately consistent. This is the key
motivation that drives us to propose the Euclidean Distance
Attack (EDA): Disturbing the Euclidean distance between
pairwise nodes in the embedding space as much as possible
with the minimal changes of the network structure.
In particular, we calculate the distance between a pair of
nodes vi and vj in the embedding space as follows:
dij = dist(ri, rj) = ||ri − rj ||2, (4)
based on which we can get the Euclidean distance matrix D =
[dij ]|V |×|V | for the whole network, with each row denoted by
Di representing the Euclidean distances between node vi and
all the other nodes in the network.
Denote the adversarial network after our EDA as Gˆ , and
its corresponding Euclidean distance matrix in the embedding
space as Dˆ. We calculate the Pearson correlation coefficient
between the distance vectors of the corresponding nodes in
the original network and adversarial network:
ϕ(G, Gˆ) =
|V |∑
i=1
|ρ(Di, Dˆi)|. (5)
Then, we focus on minimizing ϕ by changing a certain number
of links in the network with the following objective function:
minϕ(G, Gˆ). (6)
C. Rewiring perturbation
Usually, we want the perturbation to be small enough to
make the attack imperceptible for others. Taking this into
consideration, we implement the attack as a rewiring process,
i.e., adding a new link while deleting an existent one, so that
the total number of links remains the same after the attack.
We denote the set of added links as E+ ⊆ E and the set of
deleted links as E− ⊆ E in the rewiring process, where E is
the set of all pairs of unconnected nodes in G. Then, we get
the adversarial network Gˆ(V, Eˆ) with the updated set of links
Eˆ satisfying
Eˆ = E ∪ E+ − E− (7)
Suppose u links are rewired in the attack, the total number
of instances in the searching space is equal to
O(u) = Cu|E| ∗ Cu|E|, (8)
which could become very huge as the size of the network or
the number of rewiring links grows. The search for the optimal
solution is NP, and thus we adopt the Genetic Algorithm (GA)
to search for the optimal solution. The detailed procedure of
EDA is presented in Algorithm 1.
D. The evolution of EDA
Here, we use the GA to find the optimal set of rewiring
links for EDA. Typically, the algorithm consists of three parts:
encoding of the network, selection by fitness, crossover and
mutation operation:
• Encoding of network: We directly choose the rewired
links as genes, including the set of deleted links E−
and the set of added links E+. The length of each
chromosome is equal to the number of added or deleted
Algorithm 1: Method of EDA
Input: The original network G = (V,E)
Output: Adversarial network Gˆ∗
1 Initialize the node vectors R|V |×n and the distance
matrix D, with dij = dist(ri, rj);
2 while not converged do
3 Rˆ|V |×n = DeepWalk(Aˆ, n);
4 for i = 1; i ≤ |V |; i++ do
5 for j = 1; j < i; j ++ do
6 dˆij =
√
n∑
q=1
(rˆqi − rˆqj )2;
7 end
8 end
9 for i = 1; i ≤ |V |; i++ do
10 ρτ+ = ρ(Di, Dˆi);
11 end
12 fitness = 1− ρτ|V | ;
13 Gˆ = GeneticAlgorithm(G, fitness)
14 end
15 return Adversarial network Gˆ∗;
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Fig. 2. An example of crossover operation, where link (2, 8) in parent 1 and
link (3,7) in parent 2 are exchanged to produce progeny.
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links. Fig. 1 shows an overview of network encoding.
Individuals are combinations of rewiring links, represent-
ing different solutions of adversarial perturbations, and a
population consists of h individuals.
• Selection by fitness: We use Eq. (9) as the fitness
function of individual k in GA, capturing the relative
changes of vector distances in the embedding space by
the attack:
f(k) = 1− ϕ(G, Gˆ)|V | . (9)
Then, the probability that individual k is selected to be
the parent genes in the the next generation is proportional
to its fitness:
p(i) =
f(i)∑h
j=1 f(j)
. (10)
• Crossover and mutation: We then use the selected
individuals of higher fitness as the parents to generate new
individuals by adopting crossover and mutation opera-
tions, assuming that those better genes can be inherited in
the process. In particular, single point crossover between
two individuals is used, with probability pc, as shown in
Fig. 2; while for mutation, we randomly select individuals
from a population and randomly change their genes, with
probability pm, as shown in Fig. 3.
III. EXPERIMENTS
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of EDA, we compare
it with four baseline methods by performing multi-task exper-
iments on several real-world networks.
A. Data sets
Here, we choose three commonly-used benchmark social
networks to evaluate the performance of the attack strategies.
• Zachary Karate Club (Karate) [34]. The karate network
is constructed by observing a university karate club,
which consists of 34 nodes and 78 links.
Algorithm 2: Genetic Algorithm (GA)
Input: The fitness of individuals f(k), k = 1, 2, . . . , h
and the parameters h, pc, pm;
Output: Adversarial network Gˆ
1 Initialize individuals in population;
2 Elites = Retain(f(k), population);
Selection = Selection(f(k), individual);
Crossover = Crossover(pc, Section);
Mutation =Mutation(pm, Section);
3 population = Elites ∪ Crossover ∪Mutation;
4 Reconstruct network.
5 return Evolutionary network Gˆ;
TABLE I
BASIC STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF THREE NETWORKS. |V | AND |E| ARE
THE NUMBERS OF NODES AND LINKS, RESPECTIVELY; 〈k〉 IS THE
AVERAGE DEGREE; C IS THE CLUSTERING COEFFICIENT AND 〈d〉 IS THE
AVERAGE DISTANCE.
Karate Dolphin Game
|V | 34 62 107
|E| 78 159 352
〈k〉 6.686 5.129 6.597
C 0.448 0.259 0.551
〈d〉 2.106 3.357 2.904
• Game of Thrones (Game) [35]. The TV sensation Game
of Thrones is based on George Martin’s epic fantasy
novel series A Song of Ice and Fire. It is a network of
character interactions in the novel, which contains 353
links connecting 107 characters.
• Dolphin social network (Dolphin) [36]. The Dolphin
network is collected by Lusseau et al., used to describe
the interactions of dolphins in the Doubtful Sound Chan-
nel in New Zealand. This network consists of 62 nodes
and 159 links.
The basic topological properties of these networks are
presented in TABLE I.
B. Baseline methods
We perform experiments on community detection and node
classification to see how the proposed EDA degrades their
performances. In particular, we compare the performance of
EDA with that of the following baseline methods.
• Randomly Attack (RA). RA randomly deletes the ex-
istent links, while randomly adds the same number of
nonexistent links. This attack strategy does not require
any prior information about the network.
• Disconnect Internally, Connect Externally (DICE).
DICE is a heuristic attack algorithm for community
detection [30]. The attacker needs to know the true node
labels in the network and then delete the links within
community and add the links between communities.
• Randomly Link Swaping (RLS). RLS is another strat-
egy to randomize the networks. It can keep the degree
of each node unchanged [37]. In each iteration, RLS
randomly selects two links from the original network,
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Fig. 4. The framework of EDA on a network. With the evolution of perturbation, the positions of nodes in the Euclidean space constantly changes, leading
to the changing prediction results of node classification.
and then exchanges their terminal nodes. We simply
abandon the swapping operation if the newly established
link already exists to avoid multiple links between a pair
of nodes.
• Degree-Based Attack (DBA). It has been found that
many real-world networks follow the power-law distri-
bution [38], in which a small fraction of nodes (usu-
ally named as hubs) have most connections. Since it is
generally recognized that these hub nodes often have a
huge impact on the connectivity of the network, here we
also adopt another heuristic attack strategy named degree-
based attack (DBA) [24]. Specifically, in each iteration,
we select the node of the highest degree and delete one
of its links; meanwhile, we select the node with the
lowest degree and add a new connection between it and
another randomly selected unconnected node. Then, we
update the degrees of these nodes. DBA is only based on
the structure of the network, but not on the labels and
attributes of the nodes.
C. Parameter setting
For DeepWalk and GA, there are many parameters. In our
experiments, the parameter setting is empirically determined
through balancing the performance and convergence speed
shown in Table. II. Note that different parameter settings may
lead to various performances of these network algorithms, but
our attack strategies will be still effective in degrading them.
TABLE II
PARAMETERS SETTING FOR DEEPWALK AND GA.
Item Meaning Value
n number of random walk 10
r size of window 5
w length of random walk 40
d size of representation 2/4/64
h number of population size 20
niteration number of iterations 1000
nelite number of retained elites 4
ncrossover number of chromosomes for crossover 16
nmutation number of chromosomes for mutation 16
pc crossover rate 0.9
pm mutation rate 0.07
D. Attack on community detection
Community detection is one of the most common unsuper-
vised learning problems in network science, aiming to identify
the communities (a group of nodes that are closely connected
with each other) in a whole network. There are many commu-
nity detection algorithms. Here, to validate the effectiveness
of different attack strategies on network embedding, we would
prefer to first transfer nodes into vectors by DeepWalk and then
realize the community detection by clustering these vectors in
the embedding space by using K-means algorithm.
For each attack strategy, we rewire 1% to 6% links, and
then use the above community detection method to identify
communities. We use the Normalized Mutual Information
(NMI) to measure the performance [34].
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Fig. 5. NMI as the functions of the percentage of attacked links for different attack strategies on community detection.
1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6%
percentage
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
M
ic
ro
-F
1 
sc
or
e
Unattack 
RA 
RLS 
DBA 
DICE  
EDA 
(a) Karate
1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6%
percentage
0.85
0.90
0.95
M
ic
ro
-F
1 
sc
or
e
Unattack 
RA 
RLS 
DBA 
DICE  
EDA 
(b) Game
1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6%
percentage
0.86
0.88
0.90
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1.00
M
ic
ro
-F
1 
sc
or
e
Unattack 
RA 
RLS 
DBA 
DICE  
EDA 
(c) Dolphin
Fig. 6. Micro-F1 score as the functions of the percentage of attacked links for different attack strategies on node classification.
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Fig. 7. Macro-F1 score as the functions of the percentage of attacked links for different attack strategies on node classification.
NMI is used to evaluate the accuracy of a detected commu-
nity. For two different categories of prediction Cp and reality
Ct, it is defined as
NMI(Cp, Ct) =
MI(Cp, Ct)√
H(Cp)H(Ct)
, (11)
where MI and H represent the Mutual Information and en-
tropy, respectively, which are defined as
MI(Cp, Ct) =
|Cp|∑
i=1
|Ct|∑
j=1
P (i, j)log(
P (i, j)
P (i)P ′(j)
), (12)
H(Cp) =
|Cp|∑
i=1
P (i)log(P (i)), (13)
H(Ct) =
|Ct|∑
j=1
P ′(j)log(P ′(j)), (14)
respectively, where |Cp|, |Ct| are the number of categories
in the division of prediction and that of truth, respectively,
P (i) = |Cip|/|V |, P ′(j) = |Cjt |/|V |, and P (i, j) = |Cip ∩
Cjt |/|V |. The value of NMI indicates the similarity between
|Cp| and |Ct|, thus, the larger value, the more similar the
prediction and the truth are.
For each attack strategy and each proportion of rewiring
links, we carry out the experiments for 500 times and present
the average result in Fig. 5. In general, all the proposed attack
strategy can effectively reduce the accuracy of community
detection. More specifically, heuristic attack strategies, such
as DICE and DBA, are more effective than RA; while the
proposed EDA exhibits the best overall performance, with the
lowest NMI in all the three networks. Quite impressively,
as an unsupervised learn attack, EDA doesn’t require any
prior information of the communities to achieve superior
performance.
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Fig. 8. The network visualization of EDA attack. Left is the original Karate network, and the right is the adversarial network generated by EDA, which
added a link between nodes 16 and 20, while deleted a link between nodes 23 and 29. Different colors represent different communities.
E. Attack on node classification
Different from the community detection problem, node clas-
sification is a typical supervised learning problem in network
science which the label of some nodes are known. Again,
here we would like to use DeepWalk to map nodes to vectors
and then use Logistic Regression (LR) [39] to classify them,
namely DeepWalk+LR. We use the same set of benchmark
networks, since their real communities are in fact known
beforehand. We randomly choose 80% of nodes as the training
set and treat the rest as the test set, and use Micro-F1 and
Macro-F1 to evaluate the classification results. We calculate
the number of true positives (TP ), false positives (FP ), true
negatives (TN ), false negatives (FN ) in the instances.
Macro-F1 and Micro-F1 are then defined as
Macro− F1 =
∑
CP∈CT F1(CP ))
|CT | , (15)
Micro− F1 = 2 ∗ Pr ∗R
Pr +R
, (16)
respectively,where CP , CT are the category of in the division
of prediction and that of truth, F1(CP ) is the F1-measure for
the label CP , and Pr and R are calculated by
Pr =
∑
CP∈CT TP∑
CP∈CT (TP + FP )
, (17)
R =
∑
CP∈CT TP∑
CP∈CT (TP + FN)
, (18)
respectively. For multi-classification problems, Micro-F1 and
Macro-F1 are used to evaluate the performance of the classi-
fication model.
Similarly, for each attack strategy, we rewire 1% to 6%
links, and then use the above two indicators to evaluate. For
each case, we carry out the experiments for 500 times and
present the average of results in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7. We find
that both Micro-F1 and Macro-F1 decrease after each attack,
regardless of the choice of the downstream classification
algorithm (LR or KNN). In most cases, EDA still performs
best, leading to the largest drop of Micro-F1 and Macro-F1.
The heuristic attack strategies DICE is more effective than RA,
consistent with the results in community detection. However, it
seems that in certain cases when percentage of rewiring links
is relatively small, heuristic methods may be more effective
than EDA. This might be due to:
• First, comparing with DICE, which is a white-box attack
method based on the real labels of nodes, EDA is a black-
box attack method without using label information.
• Second, GA has been recognized to have a tendency to be
trapped in local optimum. But still, in the vast majority of
cases, our proposed EDA is significantly more effective
than the other attack strategies.
F. Transferability of EDA
Generally, disturbing the distance matrix between node vec-
tors in embedding space is equivalent to altering the similarity
between nodes in the network, which will naturally affect
other algorithms. We thus also examine the transferability of
the proposed DeepWalk-based EDA method for other network
algorithms.
In particular, we choose another network embedding method
High-Order Proximity preserved Embedding (HOPE) [40] and
two classic network algorithms, including Label Propagation
Algorithm (LPA) [41] and Eigenvectors of Matrices (EM) [42],
which are not based on network embedding. HOPE utilizes the
generalized SVD to handle the formulation of a class of high-
order proximity measurements. HOPE is widely used due to its
high effectiveness and efficiency. LPA sets the label of a node
identical to most of its neighbors through an iterative process,
while EM directly uses the modularity matrix to study the
community structure. We use the two relatively large networks,
i.e., Game and Dolphin, to study the transferability of EDA
to avoid a cross-page table.
The results are shown in TABLE III. Although EDA is based
on DeepWalk, it is still effective on HOPE-based node classi-
fication and community detection algorithms, i.e., HOPE+LR
and HOPE+K-Means. Moreover, it is also effective on LPA
and EM which are not based on any network embedding
algorithm. In fact, EDA still outperforms the other heuristic
attack strategies in most cases, suggesting that it has relatively
strong transferability, i.e., we can generate small perturbations
on the target network by EDA and destroy a number of
network algorithms, no matter whether it is based on a certain
network embedding method.
8TABLE III
TRANSFERABILITY RESULTS ON DIFFERENT ATTACK STRATEGIES.
Dataset model Metric Network 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6%
Game
HOPE+LR
Micro-F1
Unattack 0.9133 0.9133 0.9133 0.9133 0.9133 0.9133
RA 0.8966 0.8868 0.8774 0.8680 0.8599 0.8539
RLS 0.8963 0.8923 0.889 0.8857 0.8814 0.8769
DBA 0.8982 0.8940 0.8904 0.8867 0.8827 0.8790
DICE 0.8923 0.8799 0.8679 0.8545 0.8387 0.8291
EDA* 0.8659 0.8594 0.8516 0.8434 0.8394 0.8365
Macro-F1
Unattack 0.8688 0.8688 0.8688 0.8688 0.8688 0.8688
RA 0.8520 0.8393 0.8247 0.8116 0.8013 0.7596
RLS 0.8504 0.8452 0.8414 0.8356 0.8293 0.8230
DBA 0.8553 0.8496 0.8445 0.8401 0.8350 0.8299
DICE 0.8462 0.8290 0.8125 0.7951 0.7734 0.7197
EDA* 0.8098 0.7997 0.7876 0.7750 0.7683 0.7659
HOPE+K-Means NMI
Unattack 0.4832 0.4832 0.4832 0.4832 0.4832 0.4832
RA 0.4767 0.4757 0.4731 0.4699 0.4674 0.4621
RLS 0.4753 0.4717 0.4672 0.4594 0.4579 0.4494
DBA 0.7868 0.7744 0.7570 0.7444 0.7242 0.7107
DICE 0.4740 0.4706 0.4627 0.4590 0.4514 0.4464
EDA* 0.4720 0.4669 0.4606 0.4572 0.4512 0.4475
LPA NMI
Unattack 0.6717 0.6717 0.6717 0.6717 0.6717 0.6717
RA 0.6554 0.6349 0.6195 0.5984 0.5837 0.5653
RLS 0.6563 0.6442 0.6256 0.6098 0.5979 0.5745
DBA 0.6518 0.6268 0.6124 0.5936 0.5707 0.5498
DICE 0.6473 0.6172 0.5909 0.5689 0.5349 0.5105
EDA* 0.6228 0.5905 0.5737 0.5391 0.5262 0.4969
EM NMI
Unattack 0.7233 0.7233 0.7233 0.7233 0.7233 0.7233
RA 0.7174 0.7041 0.6995 0.6911 0.6835 0.6761
RLS 0.7171 0.7038 0.7060 0.6934 0.6882 0.6695
DBA 0.7170 0.7099 0.7022 0.7000 0.6921 0.6901
DICE 0.7190 0.6999 0.6886 0.6731 0.6624 0.6585
EDA* 0.6893 0.6860 0.6738 0.6557 0.6658 0.6418
Dolphin
HOPE+LR
Micro-F1
Unattack 0.9149 0.9149 0.9149 0.9149 0.9149 0.9149
RA 0.9115 0.9081 0.9071 0.9030 0.9000 0.8957
RLS 0.9102 0.9089 0.9078 0.9063 0.9046 0.9032
DBA 0.9111 0.9093 0.9094 0.9093 0.9082 0.9080
DICE 0.9048 0.8998 0.8896 0.8867 0.8747 0.8668
EDA* 0.8861 0.8933 0.8845 0.8798 0.8731 0.8691
Macro-F1
Unattack 0.8943 0.8943 0.8943 0.8943 0.8943 0.8943
RA 0.8926 0.8885 0.8877 0.8825 0.8793 0.8740
RLS 0.8906 0.8896 0.8887 0.8869 0.8847 0.8831
DBA 0.8919 0.8896 0.8896 0.8900 0.8884 0.8882
DICE 0.8844 0.8781 0.8666 0.8631 0.8483 0.8394
EDA* 0.8640 0.8710 0.8596 0.8539 0.8458 0.8403
HOPE+K-Means NMI
Unattack 0.3661 0.3661 0.3661 0.3661 0.3661 0.3661
RA 0.3651 0.3717 0.3616 0.3732 0.3729 0.3707
RLS 0.3415 0.3590 0.3522 0.3532 0.3453 0.3422
DBA 0.3480 0.3383 0.3395 0.3431 0.3460 0.3455
DICE 0.3351 0.3335 0.3328 0.3248 0.3226 0.3142
EDA* 0.3301 0.3204 0.3183 0.3210 0.3167 0.2964
LPA NMI
Unattack 0.6751 0.6751 0.6751 0.6751 0.6751 0.6751
RA 0.6569 0.6513 0.6406 0.6268 0.6217 0.6143
RLS 0.6622 0.6585 0.6469 0.6406 0.6279 0.6305
DBA 0.6490 0.6375 0.6207 0.6189 0.5978 0.5868
DICE 0.6340 0.6137 0.5769 0.5616 0.5236 0.5057
EDA* 0.5885 0.5846 0.5663 0.5375 0.5049 0.5016
EM NMI
Unattack 0.4968 0.4968 0.4968 0.4968 0.4968 0.4968
RA 0.4961 0.4926 0.4913 0.4860 0.4867 0.4851
RLS 0.4970 0.4950 0.4916 0.4915 0.4917 0.4830
DBA 0.4894 0.4847 0.4872 0.4895 0.4896 0.4932
DICE 0.4829 0.4780 0.4608 0.4525 0.4467 0.4368
EDA* 0.4478 0.4518 0.4462 0.4336 0.4187 0.4091
9G. Visualization and explanation
Statistics of rewiring links. To better understand how EDA
works in reality, we visualize the distributions of the added
and deleted links to see how many of them are within the
same communities or across different communities. Taking the
karate club network for example, we first present its original
network and the adversarial network after one-link attack, as
shown in Fig. 8, where we can see that the added link is across
two different communities while the deleted one is within the
same community. To give more comprehensive results, we
consider all the rewiring links in all the experiments for the
three networks, and get the percentages of added links and
deleted links within or between communities, respectively, as
shown in Fig. 10. We find that, indeed, most of the added
links are across different communities, while most of the
deleted links are within the same communities. This finding is
quite interesting, since EDA focuses in disturbing the global
structure of the network in Embedding space without any
priori knowledge of communities. One reason may be that
community is a critical structural property that matters the
embedding results, and this is why EDA behaves quite well
on attacking community detection algorithms.
The position of node vector. Furthermore, to show what
EDA actually does to network embedding, we also visualize
node vectors in a two-dimensional embedding space after the
attack. For different percentages of rewiring links ranging
from 1% to 7% in karate club network, we obtain the nodes
vectors of original and adversarial networks using DeepWalk,
and then display the results in a two-dimensional space, as
shown in Fig. 9. There are four communities represented by
different colors. When there is no attack, the node vectors
of different communities are clearly separated, as shown in
Fig. 9 (a). As the number of rewiring links increases, the node
vectors of different communities are being mixed with each
other gradually, and finally become inseparable, as shown in
Fig. 9 (h). This finding clearly demonstrates that EDA indeed
has a significantly effect on network embedding, and can
further disturb the subsequent community detection or node
classification effectively.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose the first unsupervised attack
strategy, namely EDA, on network embedding, with the focus
on disturbing the Euclidean distance between pairwise nodes
in the embedding space as much as possible with minimal
changes of the network structure. Since network embedding is
becoming the basis of many network algorithms, EDA can be
considered as a universal attack strategy which can degenerate
many downstream network algorithms.
We take the DeepWalk as the basis to design our EDA, and
a number of experiments on real networks validate that EDA
is more effective than a set of heuristic attack strategies on
degenerating community detection and node classification, no
matter whether these algorithms are based on DeepWalk or
other embedding methods, or even not based on embedding.
Such results indicate the strong transferability of our method.
Not that, our EDA is an attack on disturbing global network
structure, and we may also focus on disturbing local structure
around target nodes and links, to realize target attacks, which
belongs to our future work.
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Fig. 9. The visualization of node vectors in two-dimensional embedding space by attacking certain percentages of links. Different colors represent different
communities. As more links are attacked by EDA, it is getting more difficult to distinguish the node vectors of different communities in the embedding space.
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